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WARTIME DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS: WHAT IF
THERE WERE A WAR AND No ONE COULD BE DETAINED
WITHOUT AN ATTORNEY?
BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS L. HEMINGWAY*
I. BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2001, two aircraft hijacked by members of a] Qaeda
slammed into the World Trade Center in New York City. A third hijacked airliner
hit the Pentagon, and a fourth plunged into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers
attempted to regain control of the aircraft. Nearly 3000 innocent civilians were
killed.
In the wake of this unprecedented attack, Congress reacted swiftly and issued
the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States"
(hereinafter AUMF) on September 18, 2001.' This resolution states, in part, that
"the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.'2 Soon after
this resolution, U.S. and coalition forces commenced operations in Afghanistan
against Taliban and al Qaeda forces, fighting non-traditional enemies in a
decidedly new kind of war. Unlike in past wars, these enemies were not state
actors, nor did they abide by the rules traditionally followed in war by combatants.
This new kind of war also required a new approach to enemies captured and those
who committed violations of the law of war.
President Bush responded to this new paradigm by issuing a Presidential
Military Order in November 2001 authorizing the Department of Defense to
establish military commissions to bring to justice those non-citizen members of al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that threaten the security of America and its
allies.3 This Presidential Military Order marked the first time since World War II
.Brigadier General Hemingway is the Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority for Military
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I. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
2. Id.
3. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [Hereinafter PMO] (issuing this Order pursuant to
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that the President authorized military commissions to try enemy combatants for
violations of the law of war.4 The Presidential Military Order, § 2, defined those
subject to the order as:
[Any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom [the President] determine(s) from time to time in writing that: (1)
there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, (i) is
or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda; (ii) has
engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or
adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security,
foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more
individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of
this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that such
individual be subject to this order.
5
Separate from the Order establishing Military Commissions, the
administration embarked on a policy affecting the detention of certain enemy
combatants. The AUMF authorized the President to detain enemy combatants
engaged in hostilities against America. An "enemy combatant" is defined as:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy armed forces.
6
The Department of Defense chose to detain at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
(GTMO) some of these captured belligerents, not as criminals, but to prevent them
from rejoining hostilities. Currently, over 500 enemy combatants are detained by
the Department of Defense at GTMO.7 The President has determined that a small
subset of these detainees will face trial by Military Commissions for violations of
the laws of war, a distinct set of offenses separate from traditional civilian
offenses. t
authority granted the Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and statutory authority
expressed in 10 U.S.C. § 821, 836.).
4. Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in Terrorist Cases,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2001, at A3.
5. PMO, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833.
6. See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter TRIBUNAL ORDER],
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; Memorandum from The Secretary of
the Navy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, (July 9, 2004 ),
http://www.dod.miI/news/Ju12004/d20040730comb.pdf. [hereinafter CSRT DIRECTIVE].
7. Cf. Scott McClellan, Press Briefing, White House (June 21, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050621-4.html#n.
8. Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 4.
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Not surprisingly, enemy combatant detainees, through friends of court, soon
filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court to review the legality of
their detention as enemy combatants. 9 Petitioners challenged their detentions with
claims that they were not combatants and had not committed any offenses against
the laws of war. They challenged the failure of the United States to charge them
with any offense and to provide them with access to counsel and the courts.' 0 The
petitioners ran the gamut from U.S. citizens and non-citizens detained in the
United States and GTMO, to non-citizens detained in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The Supreme Court first weighed in on detainee-related issues stemming from
the current war in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. The Court in Hamdi addressed the question
of whether U.S. citizens, as enemy combatants, could be detained by the United
States, holding that U.S. citizens could be held as enemy combatants, but were
entitled as a matter of right to a hearing that provided some minimal procedural
ights as guaranteed by the Constitution." Specifically, a detained enemy
combatant who is a U.S. citizen is entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual assertions
before a neutral decision maker."'
12
The Supreme Court then considered the ability to detain non-citizen enemy
combatants in Rasul v. Bush. There, the court held that non-citizen enemy
combatants could be detained until the end of hostilities. Rejecting claims by the
government that detainees held at GTMO were not in U.S. territory and thus could
not seek habeas relief, the Court held that detainees were entitled to seek a review
of their detention under the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.3 The Court
did not examine whether non-citizen detainees were entitled to constitutional
protections and did not discuss hearing rights of non-citizen detainees.
In response to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense ordered the establishment of tribunals to determine the status of enemy
combatants detained at GTMO.' 4 On July 29, 2004, the Secretary of the Navy
implemented the Deputy Secretary's Order by promulgating "Implementation of
Combatant Status Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba,""5 as well as tribunals (Combatant Status Review Tribunals, or CSRTs) to
"determine ... whether the individuals detained by the Department of Defense at
the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are properly classified as enemy
combatants."' 6
9. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. Va. 2003), vacated by 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), reversed by 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir. 2003), reversed by Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
10. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459; Padilla, 352 F.3d at 698; Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1135.
11. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
12. Id.
13. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
14. See TRIBUNAL ORDER, supra note 6; see also Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 4.
15. CSRT DIRECTIVE, supra note 6.
16. Id. at 1.
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As a result of the Directive's implementation, all Department of Defense
detainees presently at GTMO have been afforded an opportunity to challenge their
status as enemy combatants before CSRTs. 17 Since implementation of the CSRT
procedures, detainees have challenged their detention by writ of habeas corpus
petitions filed in federal court. The response by the courts who have addressed
these challenges to the CSRT processes reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature and purpose of enemy detentions in the Global War on Terror and a
tortured application of criminal law concepts to fundamentally humanitarian and
law of war issues. Two decisions rendered by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, and a decision rendered by the Unites States District Court
for South Carolina, addressing the detention of enemy combatants underscore the
difficulty of federal courts in addressing issues involving wartime enemy
detainees.'
8
In the case of In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the Due Process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment are applicable to all wartime detainees at GTMO and that the CSRT
processes fail to meet these Constitutional requirements because wartime detainees
are not provided counsel or limited access to classified materials.'
9 A different
judge from the same District Court reached the opposite result in Khalid, et al. v.
Bush, holding that non-resident aliens captured and detained pursuant to the
AUMF "have no viable constitutional basis to seek a writ of habeas corpus.
2 ° In
addition to these rulings, the District Court for South Carolina reviewed the case of
a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil and designated an "enemy combatant" by the
President. That Court held in Padilla v. Hanfi that the petitioner could not be
detained unless criminal charges were brought against him.2'
These District Court decisions, coupled with the perceived ambiguity of the
Supreme Court decisions, are currently fueling the wartime detainee habeas
petitions of unprecedented number and scope. At the present time, over two
hundred detainees at GTMO have filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus
challenging their detention.
The courts, by merging law of war concepts with those of criminal law
enforcement, have inadvertently opened a Pandora's Box of endless litigation in
the U.S. courts by those who are our enemies during a time of war and whom we
17. Id.
18. See Padilla v. Hanfi, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311,
314 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
19. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 472 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that
CSRT procedures deprived both U.S. and non-U.S. citizen detainees of U.S. Constitutional rights
guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment, specifically, "In sum, the CSRT's extensive reliance on
classified information in its resolution of "enemy combatant" status, the detainee's inability to review
that information, and the prohibition of assistance of counsel jointly deprive the detainees of sufficient
notice of the factual bases for their detention and deny them a fair opportunity to challenge their
incarceration." The Court also held that some of the petitioner's claims under the Third Geneva
Convention were cognizable as valid claims.).
20. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
21. Padilla v. Hanfi, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678.
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have detained to protect ourselves and our country. The law of war is a unique
body of law formerly left within the discretion of the military and the President as
Commander-in-Chief, subject to Congressional oversight. The law of war is
unlike criminal law and the "law enforcement" methods employed to enforce that
criminal law. The courts appear to have defaulted to a law enforcement paradigm
to determine whether detention of enemy combatants is lawful - focusing on rights
to counsel, access to information, a right to be heard and to rebut findings. These
are rights afforded to those who are held pending criminal charges. Wartime
enemy detainees at GTMO are not held on the basis of possible or pending
criminal charges. Wartime enemy detainees are held to remove them from
hostilities and to ensure that they do not return to fight against America by
targeting innocent civilians. The courts, by focusing on criminal law concepts,
requirements, and rights, have demanded far more of the military to justify the
detention of wartime enemy combatants than ever required-or currently
required-under the laws of war.
As the rights of citizens vis-A-vis their own state evolve and grow under the
rubric of human rights law, the continued distinction between laws applicable in
war and those applicable in peacetime is becoming increasingly more important.
Laws applicable in peacetime involving detention based on criminal acts are often
far removed from the laws of war applicable in times of armed conflict. Human
rights advocates continue to urge that broad-reaching rights, such as the right to be
free of arbitrary detention, are applicable at all times. Although the right to be
free of "arbitrary detention" is applicable in times of war and peace, those
processes required to meet this requirement in peacetime may very well differ from
those legally justifiable in times of war. In peacetime, an examination of whether
detention is arbitrary is based on the law enforcement paradigm. In war, this
paradigm is inapplicable. Those who fail to recognize the distinction between the
law enforcement and law of war paradigms, and who urge that the two paradigms
should be merged, expose the naivet6 of individuals in the academic world (a
world far removed from war and its horrors). The application of the law
enforcement paradigm to determine if wartime detention is "arbitrary," or to
determine if certain processes fail to provide Constitutional Due Process to those
arguably entitled to Due Process, jeopardizes the fundamental principles of the law
of war and undermines the ability of America to wage war effectively. Never
before in America has the detention of wartime enemies been premised on a
paradigm that assumes criminal charges must be brought against such detainees.
23
22. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978),[hereinafter ICCPR] (stating no derogation from articles 6,
7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made in a public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation; however, states may derogate from article 14, which sets forth "fair trial rights.") Of note,
the ICCPR precludes only "arbitrary detention" and does not address specifically the detention of a
wartime enemy. Id. at art. 9(1). The Geneva Conventions provide for and authorize the detention of
those engaged in hostilities and thus, under lex specialis, the GC are controlling in matters of wartime
detention.
23. See Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural Protections
for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, n.
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II. AMERICA Is AT WAR
A. A Real, not a Metaphorical, War
America is at war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. This is not a
metaphorical war. This war is as tangible as the dust and rubble that littered the
streets of New York City on September 11, 2001. The Taliban and al Qaeda
waged a campaign of terror that started well before the 9/11 attacks. The events of
9/11 brought forth the recognition that these groups were engaged in a well-
funded, long-term, organized, and systematic campaign to destroy the United
States and its allies-the very abilities necessary to characterize their actions as
acts of war.
In 1996, al Qaeda issued a "fatwa" or call to war against America.24 In 1998,
al Qaeda issued this fatwa anew, urging all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and their
allies everywhere-including civilians.25 This fatwa predated the al Qaeda attacks
on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 by a mere six
months.26 Over 200 individuals were killed and over 2,000 injured in those
attacks.27 The attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, resulting in the death of
17 and injuries to 39, is directly attributable to al Qaeda.2 8 Other attacks directly
attributed to al Qaeda include the 9/11 attacks (2001), Richard Reid's shoe-
bombing attempt (2001), the death of Daniel Pearl (2002), the synagogue bombing
in Tunisia (2002), the attack on a French oil tanker in Yemen (2002), U.S.
casualties in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (2001-05), and attacks in
Bali, Saudi Arabia, Madrid, Jakarta, and Holland.29 Most recently, on July 7,
2005, al Qaeda associates targeted, attacked, and killed innocent civilians in
London.3°
B. International Recognition of 9/11 Attacks as Acts of War
Lest there be any doubt that the characterization of the attacks against
America on 9/11 is appropriately "acts of war," one need look only to the
subsequent actions of the U.S. Congress, the United Nations (UN), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States
(OAS), member states of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty), and the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United
66 (2003)
24. See Osama bin Laden, Fatwa, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land
of the Two Holy Places, AL QUDs AL ARABI, Aug. 1996, available at
www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa 1996.htlm.
25. See Osama bin Laden, Fatwa, AL QUDS AL ARABI, Feb. 23, 1998 (stating "Kill[ing] the
Americans and their allies--civilians and military.., is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do
it in any country in which it is possible to do it. .... ) available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen2.htm.
26. Timeline: AI-Qaeda, BBC World News, Apr. 21, 2005, at 2,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/3618762.stm.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2-8.
30. Id. at 9.
VOL. 34:1
WARTIME DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS
States of America (ANZUS treaty). The U.S. Congress passed the AUMF
authorizing the use of force. 31 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368
condemning the acts as "threats to international peace and security" and
recognizing the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the [UN] Charter." 32 NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty providing for collective self-defense. 33  The OAS issued a statement
condemning the attacks,34 and the parties to the Rio Treaty declared the attacks to
be attacks against "all American States. 35 Finally, the Prime Minister of Australia
declared the attacks sufficient to invoke the Article IV self-defense provisions of
the ANZUS treaty.36
C. Detainee Recognition of 9/11 Attacks as Constituting Armed Conflict
Those detainees who allege their detention is unlawful have not challenged
the characterization of the acts committed on 9/11 or those acts in support of 9/11
as outside the scope of an armed conflict. Rather, petitioners' writs for habeas
corpus each assert that the individuals did not commit any belligerent acts and thus
should not be detained. Further, many of the petitions assert the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions (GCs), in part, as a legal foundation to their claims,
implicitly accepting the characterization of the attacks of 9/11 as an armed conflict
governed by the law of war.37 The Supreme Court decisions affirmed the authority
of the United States to detain enemy combatants in armed conflicts against the
United States and characterized the acts of 9/11 as acts of war.
38
III. WARTIME ENEMY COMBATANT DETENTION
A. Detention of Those Engaged in Hostilities is Based on the Law of War
Wartime detention of enemy combatants is unrelated to peacetime law
enforcement principles. A nation's ability to detain enemies during wartime stems
from the laws of war, as established in part by the GCs, which authorize detention
of those engaged in hostilities until the end of hostilities. 39 Enemy combatants are
detained during times of war to remove them from the battlefield and ensure that
31. AUMF, supra note 1.
32. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept 12, 2001) available at
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOI/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf; see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
Doc. No. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001 (determining that terrorism should be addressed by all States)
available at daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/NO155743.pdf.
33. North Atlantic Treaty Organization art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
34. Statement by the Organization of American States, General Assembly, (September 11, 2001)
available at www.oas.org/Assembly200 1/assembly/gaassembly2000/GAterrorism.htm.
35. See id.
36. Statement by John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, "Application of ANZUS Treaty to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States," (Sep. 14, 2001) (expressing shock and outrage at the attacks on
the United States and invoking Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty as applicable to the terrorists attacks)
available at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media-releases/2001/mediarelease 1241 .htm.
37. See e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
38. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
39. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 111].
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they do not return to take up arms.40 "Captivity in war is 'neither revenge, nor
punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent
the prisoners of war from further participation in the war.""" Although individuals
who engage in acts that violate the laws of war may be held on the basis of
pending law of war charges, enemy combatants can be held solely because of the
combatant status itself. In short, in the law of war paradigm, an enemy combatant
may be detained for as long as hostilities exist without being charged with a law of
war violation.
The fundamental difference between civilian criminal law enforcement and
the laws of war was recognized by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. The
Court upheld the detention of enemy combatants, including U.S. citizen
combatants, until the end of hostilities42 as authorized under the laws of war43 and
exercised by the President pursuant to powers granted by, and incident to, the
AUMF.44 The AUMF authorizes the President to use "all necessary and
appropriate force against nations, organizations, or persons associated with the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. ' '4 The Supreme Court noted that detention
of such individuals "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an
exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the
President to use" against those individuals involved in the terrorist attacks of
September 1, 2001 .46 "The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is
explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow
category of individuals who were allegedly part of or supporting forces hostile to
the United States or coalition partners and who engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States. 'A7 The uncertain duration of detention neither affects
this authorization nor alters the principle that those involved in hostilities are
subject to detention until the end of hostilities.
B. Rights of Wartime Detainees
1. Detainee Rights under the Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC
1II), authorizing detention of combatants until the end of hostilities, 48 makes no
distinctions based on citizenship of combatants in authorizing such detention of
those engaged in hostile acts.49 GC III provides certain rights regarding the
40. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (2nd ed. 1988).
41. Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 (2002)
(quoting the assertion in 1941 made by German Admiral Canaris, in protest against the regulations
concerning Russian prisoners of war issued by the German army authorities, later approved as legally
correct by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg).
42. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
43. See GC II1, supra note 39, art. 118.
44. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
45. AUMF, supra note 1.
46. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
47. Id.
48. GC 1II, supra note 39, at art. 118.
49. See id.
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classification of detained individuals during an international armed conflict.
50
Individual detainees classified as prisoners of war are entitled to a full array of
protections not otherwise available. If the status of an individual as a prisoner of
war is in doubt, Article 5 of GC III provides that the status of such an individual
shall be determined by a "competent tribunal."51 Prisoner of war status does not
apply to those who fall outside the protections of GC III.
The President has determined that the GCs are inapplicable to al Qaeda
because non-state organizations fall outside the jurisdiction of the GCs, and the
Taliban, although falling within the jurisdictional requirements of GC III, fails to
meet the requirements set forth therein for those protections provided by the GCs
to prisoners of war:
5 2
Under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention ... Taliban detainees are not
entitled to POW status . .. [T]he Taliban have not effectively
distinguished themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan.
Moreover, they have not conducted their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war ... Al Qaeda is an international terrorist
group and cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva
Conventions. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva
Convention, and are not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status under
the treaty.
53
The courts have recognized that the President's determination is legally
based54 and that the GCs' protections do not apply to members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban held as enemy combatants.55
More importantly, the GCs are not relevant to a determination of whether a
detained individual is subject to detention. The GCs do not provide for a
mechanism such as a hearing or a tribunal to determine if an individual is properly
detained as an individual engaged in hostilities. Although the United States
historically has utilized procedures to review and determine whether detainees in a
war are innocent civilians inadvertently captured and detained on the battlefield,
56
these procedures are not mandated by any law, statute or treaty nor are they rights
50. See id., at art. 2.
51. See id., at art. 5.
52. See Ari Fleischer, Press Release, White House, White House Press Secretary Announcement
of President Bush's determination regarding legal status of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees (Feb 7,
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/I/38727.htm.
53. See id.
54. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
55. See id.
56. See U.S. Dep'ts of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation
190- 8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1997) [hereinafter AR 190-8] (providing for Article 5 hearings
if the prisoner of war status of an enemy detainee is in doubt. As a matter of practice, U.S. military
services have utilized the Article 5 model set forth in AR 190-8 to determine if a detainee is an innocent
civilian inadvertently captured in the fog of war.).
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held by the detainee." These procedures were implemented in determining if an
individual was an enemy combatant prior to detention at GTMO.58
Petitioners who argue that the GCs provide a basis to attack the legality of
their detention do so by "bleeding" detention issues based on hostile acts as an
enemy combatant with detention based on law of war criminal charges before
military commissions - merging the law of war and law enforcement paradigms.
Prisoners of war can be tried only by those courts providing the same rights as
courts applicable to military members of the Detaining Power 59 and, thus, this
"bleed" presents a cognizable argument at first glance. In the United States,
military members are subject to trial by courts-martial 6 and are provided differing
procedures than those applicable to military commissions. 61 Thus, if an enemy
combatant detained at GTMO were to be detained solely on the basis of criminal
charges before military commissions, the personal jurisdiction of military
commissions might well be recognizable by the courts as an issue within the
jurisdiction of a writ of habeas corpus. However, these facts are not before the
courts. Indeed, if a writ of habeas corpus attacking the jurisdiction of the military
commissions were successful, the remedy of release would be unavailable because
the detainees, notwithstanding possible law of war violations, are also held as
enemy combatants for whom there is no requirement that criminal charges be
brought.
2. Detainee Rights under the Geneva Conventions are Unenforceable
Whether a private individual is entitled to the GCs' protections becomes moot
in a court challenge if the law does not recognize that U.S. domestic law creates a
judicially enforceable GC right. If the GCs are not judicially enforceable, the issue
of whether al Qaeda or Taliban members are protected by the GCs is moot.
Likewise mooted is the question of whether the GCs afford detainees certain rights
upon which to base an argument of unlawful detention. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld recently held that
there is no individual right of enforcement of the GCs.62 In that case, petitioner
detainees challenged the authority and procedures of military commissions by
writs of habeas corpus, relying in large part on the argument that the Geneva
Conventions create judicially enforceable rights. The Court noted that the
obligations imposed by the GCs are obligations of a state to other states, not the
obligations of states to individuals. Although the GCs require that states provide
57. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (holding that the GC provide no individual right of
enforcement).
58. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (noting that certain processes were
implemented to determine if Hamdi was an enemy combatant).
59. GC Ill, supra note 39, at art. 102.
60. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, art. 2. (2005) [hereinafter UCMJ].
61. For example, the UCMJ excludes hearsay falling outside scope of exceptions and imposes
strict requirements for authenticating documents prior to admission into evidence. MIL. R. EVID. 901.
62. Hamdan, 415 F. 3d 33.
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certain protections to those detained in war and those who are prisoners of war,
these "rights" are not rights of individuals, they are treaty obligations of states.63
In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi "rejected Hamdi's Geneva
Convention claim, concluding that the convention is not self-executing and that,
even if it were, it would not preclude the Executive from detaining Hamdi until the
cessation of hostilities. '64  This decision underscores the idea that the GCs
authorize the detention of those engaged in hostilities until the end of hostilities.
Assuming that an individual enemy combatant possesses a private cause of action
to enforce the GCs, only the cessation of hostilities could provide a basis for a
determination that detention was unlawful. No petitioner has alleged that
hostilities have ended. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined in 2004 that
hostilities were still ongoing in Afghanistan. With the recent bombings in London,
a myriad of al Qaeda recruiting and training sites on the web, continued al Qaeda
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and continued public pronouncements by top
al Qaeda leaders, a court would be hard pressed to determine that al Qaeda has
ceased to engage in hostilities.
IV. REVIEW OF WARTIME ENEMY COMBATANT DETENTION
A. Availability of Writ of Habeas Corpus to Challenge Wartime Detention of
Enemy Combatants
For the first time in history, the Supreme Court has entered an arena
previously reserved for military commanders and those schooled in the nuances
and exigencies of the war and the laws of war. The Supreme Court ruled in Rasul
and Hamdi that certain wartime detainees who are not facing charges by military
courts have a statutory right to challenge the legality of their wartime detention as
enemy combatants by writ of habeas corpus. 65 These decisions launched U.S.
courts into oversight of the wartime requirements and procedures for detaining
enemy combatants. Previously, the detention of those engaged in hostilities
resided solely within military authority, including the President as Commander-in-
Chief, subject to Congressional oversight. Although Congress is empowered to act
in this area,66 it has not.67
The cases relied upon by the U.S. federal courts in determining the legality of
detention rest on facts quite different from those before us. Specifically, the facts
of those cases involved detention arising from pending criminal charges before
military courts. In each instance, the petitioner was under military charges and
alleged that the military court was without personal jurisdiction. These facts are
distinguishable from those at hand involving the detention of enemy combatants
63. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 100-104.
64. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003).
65. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 552 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
67. But see, S. 1042, 109th Congress (2005) (providing for CSRT and proceedings of CSRTs,
specifically, providing counsel to detainees at annual review boards that supplement CSRTs, subject to
Presidential modification).
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based on their status as enemy combatants - not pending criminal charges before
military courts. Thus, each petitioner's attempts to conflate an analysis of the
legality of detention with issues of military commission jurisdiction is misplaced.
This merger of "detention" of combatants to prevent their return to hostilities with
"detention" pending criminal prosecution has been argued successfully in some
lower courts.68
B. Minimal Procedural Requirements for Wartime Detentions; A Two-Tiered
System?
The Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Rasul distinguished between
wartime detention of U.S. citizens and non-citizens as well as between those U.S.
citizens captured on the battlefield and those captured elsewhere.69 As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Hamdan, the
Supreme Court in Rasul, regarding a non-U.S. citizen, "decided a . . . 'narrow'
question: whether federal courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 'to
consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals' at
Guantanamo Bay."7 ° The Supreme Court in Hamdi broadened this inquiry by
considering challenges to detention by citizen detainees. Although the Supreme
Court held that both citizens and non-citizens alike may be held as enemy
combatants until the end of hostilities, the distinction between citizen and non-
citizen detainees, and the differing rights afforded each, is significant.
1. Wartime Detention of U.S. Citizens
The distinction drawn by the courts between citizen and non-citizen enemy
combatants is based, in part, on specific U.S. statutory law relating to detention of
citizens 71 and Constitutional provisions embodying Due Process requirements that
are arguably inapplicable to non-U.S. citizens. However, the Supreme Court's
decisions in analyzing and applying U.S. statutory law intersperse law enforcement
concepts into law of war considerations. The Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a), requires "an Act of Congress" to support detention of a U.S. citizen.72
The Supreme Court in Hamdi affirmed that the AUMF satisfies this underlying
requirement of Congressional action under this statutory provision.73 However, it
appears that the Court sidestepped the underlying rationale for the Non-Detention
Act. The legislative history of this act reveals that wartime detention of U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants was neither raised nor considered. The basis of this
statute was the law enforcement paradigm focusing on detention of those suspected
of crimes. The failure of the courts to recognize the appropriate scope of the Non-
Detention Act did not undermine the Court's conclusion as to the wartime
68. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467-468 (4th Cir. 2003).
69. Hamdi v, Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003); see generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
70. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2005).
72. Id. at § 4001(a).
73. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
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authority of the President or the military in this instance. Nonetheless, the scope of
this statute arguably was improperly characterized.74
In addition to holding that citizens could be held as enemy combatants, the
Supreme Court also distinguished between those captured on the battlefield and
those captured elsewhere. The Supreme Court did not venture to define the
"battlefield" in Hamdi, holding only that "Congress ... authorized detention [of
enemy combatants] in the narrow circumstances considered here, 75 that is, capture
in Afghanistan during active hostilities in which the accused allegedly turned over
his Kalashnikov upon capture with his Taliban unit. The Supreme Court did not
address what, if any, differing standards might apply to the detention of those
citizens captured outside the battlefield. In Padilla, the Supreme Court noted that
Padilla was a U.S. citizen taken into custody at O'Hare Airport, initially under a
protected witness warrant. He was later determined by the President to be an
enemy combatant and subject to wartime detention. The Supreme Court held only
that Padilla must file his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appropriate
district court.7 6 The Supreme Court, while specifically noting that U.S. citizens
were subject to detention as enemy combatants,77 did not address the issue of the
scope of wartime detention of U.S. citizens or the definition and impact of whether
an individual was captured on the battlefield.
The Hamdi court also addressed the issue of whether the Constitution
required specific processes to implement the AUMF vis-A-vis wartime detention of
American citizens, an issue not addressed by the AUMF. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen,
argued that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were fully applicable to a
determination of whether an individual has enemy combatant status, mandating the
right to confrontation and counsel.78 In determining which processes were
constitutionally required by the Due Process Clause applicable to U.S. citizens, the
Court commented: "Our resolution of this dispute requires a careful examination..
of the Due Process Clause, which informs the procedural contours of that
mechanism in this instance."79 One court further noted:
74. Compare id. at 515 (expressing "doubt as to Hamdi's argument that § 4001(a), which provides
that '[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress,"' required express congressional authorization of detentions of this sort."); with Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating "l[i]t is likewise significant that § 4001(a)
functioned principally to repeal the Emergency Detention Act. That statute had provided for the
preventive "apprehension and detention" of individuals inside the United States "deemed likely to
engage in espionage or sabotage' during 'internal security emergencies."' H.R. Rep. 92-116, at 2 (Apr.
6, 1971). Proponents of the repeal were concerned that the Emergency Detention Act might, inter alia,
'permit a recurrence of the round ups which resulted in the detention of Americans of Japanese ancestry
in 1941 and subsequently during World War I.' There is no indication that § 4001(a) was intended to
overrule the longstanding rule that an armed and hostile American citizen captured on the battlefield
during wartime may be treated like the enemy combatant that he is. We therefore reject Hamdi's
contention that § 4001(a) bars his detention." (citation omitted).).
75. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
76. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
77. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 516.
78. See id. at 524 - 25.
79. Id. at 525.
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Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is
equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this
country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is
during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those
times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles
for which we fight abroad.
80
Justice O'Connor, writing on behalf of a plurality of the Court, applied the
analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge 81 and concluded that such hearings must
provide "notice . .. and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decision maker., 82 The Supreme Court in Mathews
employed a balancing test to address the serious competing interests between the
government and an individual "and for determining the procedures that are
necessary to ensure that a citizen is not 'deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.' 83 Justice O'Connor wrote:
Mathews dictates that -the process due in any given instance is
determined by weighing "the private interest that will be affected by the
official action" against the Government's asserted interest, "including
the function involved" and the burdens the Government would face in
providing greater process .... The Mathews calculus then contemplates
a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of "the risk
of an erroneous deprivation" of the private interest if the process were
reduced and the "probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
safeguards. (citation omitted).
84
In Mathews, the Supreme Court examined the rights required by the Due
Process Clause in administrative hearings potentially resulting in denial of
disability benefits. The Court in Mathews noted that only one prior case required
rights approximating a judicial trial and concluded that generally such hearings
required only notice and the right of response or personal appearance at the
hearing.85 The cases relied upon in Mathews are distinguishable from the present
enemy detention cases because the courts did not examine hearing rights
applicable to detention and did not implicate the federal habeas statute. Thus, the
courts in these cases did not examine the relationship between the Due Process
Clause and the federal habeas statute.
The Supreme Court in Hamdi, applying the Mathews analysis in light of the
federal habeas statute,86 determined that two core elements of Due Process cannot
80. Id. at 532.
81. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
82. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533.
83. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-34.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2005) (authorizing issuance of writ of habeas corpus if the detainee is
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. § 2243
VOL. 34:1
WARTIME DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS
be abrogated - the right to notice and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's
factual assertions before a neutral decision maker. Both of these requirements are
based on the law enforcement paradigm, as is evidenced by 28 U.S.C. § 2247,
which provides that "[o]n application for a writ of habeas corpus documentary
evidence, transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and sentence and a
transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar application by
or in behalf of the same petitioner, shall be admissible in evidence."
87
Separate and distinct from the Mathews analysis, the Supreme Court
concluded that the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to federal habeas review
required the implementation of these two core "rights."88 It is unclear how or why
processes applicable to habeas review were held to be applicable to the
requirements of the underlying detention procedures.
In further discussing the procedural requirements of a hearing to determine
enemy combatant status, the Supreme Court in Hamdi opined that exigent
circumstances may justify procedures admitting hearsay or implementing a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence. 89 The Supreme
Court stated, "[t]here remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal,"90 and referenced Article 5 tribunals' processes set forth in Army
Regulation 190-8 (AR 190-8). 9' Article 5 tribunals under GC III are constituted to
determine the status of a detainee as a Prisoner of War when doubt exists as to that
status.92 Prisoner of war status provides many protections otherwise unavailable to
a detainee and generally is a sought-after status.93 The only procedural right
afforded a detainee by Article 5 of GC III is a hearing before a "competent
tribunal., 94 Over time, America has expanded procedural protections afforded a
detainee in Article 5 proceedings as a matter of policy. These expanded
protections are found in AR 190-8 as well as other U.S. military directives and
regulations governing Article 5 procedures. 95 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the government's proposal that a declaration of statements
(2005) (calling for the court to "summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as
law and justice requires.").
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2247 (2005).
88. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525-26 (2004).
89. Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 538.
91. Id.
92. GC III, supra note 39, at art. 5
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., AR190-8, supra note 56.
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obtained from the detainee in an interrogation setting96 based on the "some
evidence standard" 97 were sufficient to establish enemy combatant status.
2. Wartime Detention of Non-Citizens
The Supreme Court in Rasul did not discuss what process a non-citizen is
entitled to in determining enemy combatant status. That portion of the Hamdi
analysis based on 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) is inapplicable to a non-citizen; this statute
applies only to citizens.98 Likewise, the Due Process Clause is arguably limited to
citizens or those with significant U.S. contacts. 99
The Mathews analysis is arguably inapplicable to non-citizens. However, the
Supreme Court's importation of the habeas corpus procedures to the underlying
hearing process to determine enemy combatant status does not appear to be
impacted by citizenship. If the Court places reliance on this importation, which
appears to be the case, the courts may require the government to afford non-citizen
enemy combatants the same procedures as are afforded to citizens.
C. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
1. Background
In response to the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Rasul, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense ordered the establishment of tribunals to determine the status
of enemy combatants detained by the Department of Defense at GTMO.'0 ° The
Secretary of the Navy implemented this order by a directive establishing
procedural and substantive guidance. l1' The purpose of the CSRT is to determine
if the detained individual meets the definition of an "enemy combatant." "Enemy
combatant" is defined as "an individual who was a part of or supporting Taliban or
al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.' ' 2  Between August 2004 and January
2005, detainees held by the Department of Defense at GTMO were provided the
opportunity to challenge their detention and designation as enemy combatants.
2. Procedural Guarantees
CSRTs are similar to GC III, Article 5 tribunals as implemented and
expanded upon in AR 190-8. CSRTs are composed of three officers and are
assisted by a non-voting Recorder. 10 3 The standard of proof is preponderance of
96. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004) (noting that "The Government recognizes
the basic procedural protections required by the habeas statute, but asks us to hold that, given both the
flexibility of the habeas mechanism and the circumstances presented in this case, the presentation of the
Mobbs Declaration to the habeas court completed the required factual development. It suggests two
separate reasons for its position that no further process is due.").
97. Id. at 537.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2005).
99. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 514 (2004).
100. TRIBUNAL ORDER, supra note 6.
101. CSRT Directive, supra note 6, at Enclosure 1(B).
102. Id. at B.
103. See id. at C(l), C(2).
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the evidence, 0 4 rather than the "some evidence" standard rejected by the Court in
Hamdi. The detainee has the right to be advised of the reasons for detention, be
assisted by a personal representative, receive summaries of unclassified evidence
prior to the hearing, call reasonably available witnesses, present documents,
question witnesses, address the tribunal, remain silent, and be present at all open
sessions of the tribunal. 105 The Recorder is responsible for searching government
files to determine if any information exists that is relevant to the detainee's
position. 106 An interpreter is made available if required. 10 7 A written report is
made of the decision, and this report is reviewed by the Staff Judge Advocate for
legal sufficiency. 10 8  The CSRT Director (a two-star admiral) automatically
reviews each report.10 9 CSRT hearings have been attended by the media, the
ICRC, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).1 0
3. CSRTs Provide a Detainee Significantly More Procedural Protections
Than Those Afforded by GC III, Article 5, and AR 190-8
The procedural protections afforded a detainee by CSRTs exceed those
required by GCIII, Article 5, or AR 190-8. GC III, Article 5 requires only a
hearing before a "competent tribunal." A "competent tribunal" is not based on the
law enforcement model; Article 5 tribunals are not courts."' The GCs set forth no
other requirements for an Article 5 tribunal. Pursuant to GC 1II, Article 5 hearings
are only provided a detainee if there is doubt as to his status; they were not
envisioned to apply to all detainees. Relevant commentary addressed this issue
and indicated that Article 5 would be applied only in limited circumstances.
l1 2
Despite its anticipated limited use, the GCs afford a detainee the right only to a
competent tribunal. GC III, Article 5 creates no right to counsel before the tribunal.
Article 5 hearings under AR 190-8 are held when the status of an individual
as a prisoner of war is in doubt.1 3 The rights afforded a detainee by CSRTs
exceed those provided under AR 190-8. CSRTs authorize a personal
104. Id. at B.
105. See id. at F.
106. See id. at C(2).
107. See id. at C(57).
108. See id. at 1(7).
109. See id. at 1(5).
110. United States, SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE COMMITTEE
AGAINST TORTURE, CAT/C/48/Add.3May 6, 2005, Sec. IIC (May 6, 2005) stating "CSRTs are
transparent proceedings. Members of the media, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
and non-governmental organizations may observe military commissions and the unclassified portions of
the CSRT proceedings. They also have access to the unclassified materials filed in Federal court.")
111. See ICRC, Jean S. Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, III
Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War p. 77, 1960 (stating that the original
term "responsible authority" was changed to "competent tribunal" because of the view that such a
decision should not be left to a "single person, who might often be of subordinate rank." There was a
certain degree of opposition by several states who felt that the decision should be taken by a court.
This position was rejected. Id. at 563 (emphasis added)).
112. See id., at art. 5.
113. See AR 190-8, supra note 56, ch. 1-6(a).
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
representative to assist the accused, who is provided access to classified
information otherwise unavailable to the accused because of national security
concerns. 1 14  The personal representative meets with the detainee prior to the
hearing to determine if the detainee desires to present evidence or call witnesses.'
1 15
The personal representative may present information relevant to the detainee's
status.' 16 Although the personal representative is not an attorney, he or she is an
advocate for the detainee in the non-adversarial hearing. AR 190-8 does not
provide a detainee the assistance of a personal representative, does not require a
minimum of 30 days notice prior to the hearing, and does not allow for access to
all evidence by the accused's representative' 17 - all of which are provided by
CSRTs."'1
V. CURRENT DETENTION CASES
A. Background
Since the Supreme Court rulings in Rasul, Padilla, and Hamdan, over 200
detainees held by the Department of Defense at GTMO have filed petitions for
habeas corpus. Subsequently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
has issued two opinions addressing whether the detention of enemy combatants
pursuant to procedures of CSRTs are lawful: In re Guantanamo Bay119 and Khalid
v. Bush. 12 0  In addition, the U.S. District Court for South Carolina addressed
wartime enemy detentions in the cases of Padilla v. Hanft'21 and Al-Marri v.
Hanft. 12 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has not yet ruled
on the appeals in the D.C. District Court cases which had oral argument in
September and October 2005; however, oral argument was heard in Padilla v.
Hanft on July 15, 2005, and a ruling is expected within a few months. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Hamdan, a case
raising the issue of jurisdiction of military commissions, issued an opinion on July
15, 2005, that impacts certain of those issues raised by petitioners in the detention
cases and is instructive in that regard.
B. Specific Judicial Decisions Post-Supreme Court Rulings
In In re Guantanamo Detainees, a case that includes 11 consolidated habeas
cases, Judge Joyce Hens Green, U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia,
held that the petitioners, including non-resident aliens, "stated valid claims under
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that the procedures implemented
by the government to confirm that the petitioners are 'enemy combatants' subject
114. See CSRT Directive, supra note 6, at C(3).
115. See id., at F(6) & G(2) and G(4).
116. See CSRT Directive, supra note 6, at C(3).
117. See AR 190-8, supra note 56.
118. See CSRT Directive, supra note 6.
119. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,445 (D.D.C. 2005).
120. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 314 (D.D.C. 2005).
121. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (D.S.C. 2005).
122. Al - Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 673-74 (D. S.C. 2005).
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to indefinite detention violate the petitioners' rights to due process of law."' 2 3 The
court also recognized claims of petitioners under GC III.
The court discussed the uncertain and indefinite nature of detention of
"enemy combatants" and highlighted that many were not caught on the battlefield.
The court noted that certain detainees face criminal charges and possibly life
imprisonment and opined that enemy combatants might face the same plight - a
life of detention - without any of those same rights afforded those charged with
criminal violations of the law of war.1 24 With this as a backdrop, the court
determined that all detainees at GTMO must be afforded the rights of Due Process
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and held that the CSRT processes
violated Due Process.
The court noted that the Supreme Court employed the Mathews analysis in the
Hamdi case and, except for the fact that Hamdi is a citizen and none of the
petitioners in the case before the court are U.S. citizens, Hamdi is the "starting
point and core of this Court's consideration of what process is due to the
Guantanamo detainees in these cases."'' 25 In holding that all detainees are entitled
to the Constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment, the court noted that the
"American authorities are in full control in Guantanamo Bay, [and] their activities
are immune from Cuban law., 126 The court focused on the liberty interest of
detainees, the potential length of detention, and the government's national security
interests in determining what procedural guarantees "ensure that innocents are not
indefinitely held as 'enemy combatants.' 127  The court held that the CRST
processes failed to meet Due Process requirements because detainees are not
provided counsel and are not permitted access to classified material. 128 In other
specific situations, the court held that the CRST processes violated Due Process
because of how allegations of torture were handled and the application of the term
"enemy combatant."
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also addressed the issue
of wartime detention in Khalid, a case involving "non-resident aliens captured
outside of Afghanistan." 129 In the Memorandum Opinion and Order of Judge
Richard J. Leon, the court notes that the Petitioners "are asking this Court to do
something no federal court has done before: evaluate the legality of the
Executive's capture and detention of non-resident aliens, outside the United States,
during a time of armed conflict." The court held that Congress authorized the
Executive to capture and detain enemy combatants,13 ° and that "no viable legal
123. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 445.
124. Id. at 447, 465-66; DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 14, at c (finding detainees
charged with criminal offenses are provided counsel, among other rights).
125. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
126. Id. at 463.
127. Id. at 466-67.
128. See id. at 468-69.
129. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 316 (D. D.C. 2005).
130. See id.
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theory exists by which it (the court) could issue a writ of habeas corpus."13' In
reviewing the grounds asserted by the petitioners as a basis for relief, the court
found that the AUMF authorized the President to capture and detain enemy
combatants. Further, the court determined that non-resident aliens captured and
detained outside the United States have no cognizable constitutional rights.' 32 The
court noted that the Supreme Court found in Rasul that the detainees at GTMO,
including non-U.S. citizens, have a right to challenge the lawfulness of their
detention though writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court in Rasul and Hamdi
did not address the issue of whether wartime detainees are entitled to any
constitutional, statutory, or treaty rights that might establish grounds for the court
to grant the habeas petition. 133
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, in the case of
Padilla v. Hanft, examined the narrow issue of whether the Executive is authorized
to detain U.S. citizens captured in the United States as enemy combatants. 134 The
court in Padilla relied on Padilla's U.S. citizenship and determined that the
President was without authority to hold Padilla as an enemy combatant. The court,
in determining whether the AUMF authorized the President to detain an American
citizen, stated "[it] must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of
legislative or executive authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater
restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the
language they used."'135  The court held that the AUMF did not meet the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Non-Detention Act, and that the
executive was without authority to detain U.S. citizens as wartime detainees. The
court further noted that Padilla could only be detained if he were charged with
criminal offenses, relying solely on the criminal law paradigm to justify wartime
detention of U.S. citizens engaged in acts of war against the United States. 
36
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina also reviewed a case
factually distinguishable from Padilla. The court, in Al- Marri v. Hanft, 
137
addressed challenges to detention raised by a non-citizen, resident alien enemy
combatant who was captured in the United States and detained at GTMO. The
court distinguished the Padilla case on the basis of the citizenship of the detainee
and held that "detention is proper pursuant to the AUMF."' 138 Significantly, the
court found that criminal charges brought against the detainee did not prevent his
detention as an enemy combatant.
139
131. Id. at 314.
132. See id. at 320-21.
133. But see, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
134. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005).
135. Id. at 689 (quoting Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944)).
136. See id.
137. Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-78 (D.S.C. 2005).
138. Id. at 680.
139. Id. at 681.
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VI. THE MILITARY'S ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND DETAIN ENEMY COMBATANTS
A. Current Status of Military Detention Requirements
The Supreme Court held that U.S. and non-U.S. citizens are subject to
wartime detention until the end of hostilities as authorized by the AUMF. 140 The
court further held that U.S. citizen detainees are entitled under the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution to a wartime hearing in which the detainee must
receive notice and in which the detainee must be afforded an opportunity to rebut
the government's evidence and conclusions.' 4' The Supreme Court rejected as
insufficient the "some evidence" standard proposed by the government and also
rejected hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit summarizing the evidence
establishing the detainee as an enemy combatant. 142 Although the Supreme Court
opined that those processes set forth in AR 190-8, modeled on GC III, Article 5,
hearings, might meet the wartime detention hearing requirements, the District
Court for the District of Columbia, in In re Guantanamo Cases, held that the
detainee was entitled to counsel and to review classified information, protections
which far exceed those provided by AR 190-8 or GC III, Article 5.143
In addition to those cases raising the issues of unlawful detention as an enemy
combatant, the petitioner in Hamdan raised the issue of detention on the basis of
charges pending before military commissions. 144 In April 2004, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, a non-U.S. citizen detainee charged with offenses before military
commissions, filed a petition of writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of
his detention pending criminal charges, the authority of the President to authorize
military commissions, and the procedures of the military commissions. 145 On
November 8, 2004, the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, in a
decision by Judge Robertson, held that Hamdan could not be tried by military
commission until such time as it was determined by a competent tribunal that he
was not a prisoner of war and until such time as military commission procedures
did not authorize hearings from which an accused could be excluded. 146 The court
found that the GCs were enforceable and that Hamdan was presumptively a
prisoner of war entitled to be tried by courts-martial rather than military
commissions. 147 Implicit in its decision, the court found that the scope of habeas
corpus extended to the jurisdiction and procedures of military commissions. 148 For
the court to extend the scope of habeas to military commission jurisdiction and
proceedings, out of necessity, the court was required to premise Hamdan's
detention on criminal charges pending before military commissions rather than his
status as an enemy combatant. The decision of the court was overturned by the
140. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004).
141. See, generally, id.
142. Id. at 527-28.
143. In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,472 (D.D.C. 2005).
144. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35-37 (D.C.Cir. 2005).
145. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
146. Id. at 173.
147. Id. at 165.
148. See id.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on July 15, 2005.149
Nonetheless, the issue of whether the scope of a writ of habeas corpus may reach
the jurisdiction of military commissions when such jurisdiction is not the basis for
an enemy combatant's detention remains unaddressed.
B. Impact on U.S. War-fighting Capability
The decisions of the Supreme Court and lower courts that seemingly apply
criminal law concepts to law of war issues adversely impact U.S. war-fighting
capabilities.
Traditionally in war, those who fell into the hands of the enemy were at the
mercy of the enemy. Over time, humanitarian laws developed to mitigate the
effects of what is otherwise the most horrific activity on the face of this earth -
war.150 The courts, in ruling on wartime detention issues, determined that U.S.
citizen detainees are entitled to hearing procedures that provide Due Process. 151
Although the Supreme Court, in addressing the right of writ to habeas corpus,
stated that wartime detention hearings are required for the continued detention of
U.S. citizen enemy combatants, it is unclear what procedural protections must be
afforded detainees.
Capturing an enemy on the battlefield and disarming him is a routine combat
activity. Once an enemy is detained and removed from the area of active
hostilities, the soldier who captured the enemy remains on the front lines -
fighting. The capturing unit is responsible for providing the date of capture,
location of capture, capturing unit, and how the person was captured. 5 2 The pace
of combat is brutal; there is little to no opportunity for a soldier to stop and fill out
extensive questionnaires about how he came to capture an individual. Further, the
information available to subsequent individuals who might review the status of the
detainee is necessarily hearsay because the capturing soldier has returned to the
font lines, been shipped home, or been killed or wounded. In many situations,
hearsay is the only existing evidence establishing a reason to believe that the
detained individual was involved in hostilities against the United States.
Additional proof that a person engaged in hostilities against America may be
impossible to obtain. As time passes, the government will not necessarily obtain
additional extrinsic evidence against a detainee. Much additional information, if
any, will have been obtained from the detainee or other detained individuals
through questioning. The detainee's challenge to his detention will necessarily
originate from the detainee during early questioning. AR 190-8's tribunal
provisions, which were modeled after Article 5 GC III tribunals, account for these
considerations and admit statements of a detainee.1
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149. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C.Cir. 2005).
150. See, e.g. GC III, supra note 39; See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
151. See, e.g. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d
152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004).
152. AR 190-8, supra note 56, at 2-1(b).
153. Id. at 1.6.
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Wartime detention hearings are not adversarial tribunals, administrative
hearings, or courts. An Article 5 tribunal, as set forth by AR 190-8 and referenced
by the Court in Hamdi, is a wartime tribunal; there are no parties, there are no
"rights," there is no counsel, and there is no opportunity for the detainee to demand
access to all the government's classified information. 154 The standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence.155 The nature of the evidence to be considered is
not limited, in recognition of the nature and complexity of war.
The court in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases in focusing on indefinite
detention did not simply focus on the length of detention; but also on the nature of
the battlefield and the passage of time. These considerations by the court, if they
withstand appellate scrutiny, could lead to implementation of processes that would
otherwise be impossible or impracticable in a traditional war. The "new"
battlefield raises the specter that perhaps the nature and mode of evidence available
to review a detainee's status might differ from that of battlefield detainees of past
wars. Nonetheless, rights available to wartime detainees cannot and should not be
evaluated on the basis of specific facts under limited circumstances. The rules of
war are designed to apply in times of war and hostilities. There are not separate
laws for wars of differing duration, scope or intensity. Is the military to become
obligated to document all facts surrounding a capture of an enemy, to document
the basis for such capture, to produce soldiers to appear in an adversarial setting to
be cross-examined by a detainee's counsel, and to provide the manpower and
support necessary to conduct formal, legal hearings in all cases of wartime
detention (such as those in GTMO that exceed three years duration)? 15 6 If so,
America's war-fighting ability will be markedly and adversely affected if the
duties of our soldiers as warriors are forced to compete with the obligation to act as
investigators.
VII. CONCLUSION
Bad facts make bad law. When it comes to America's war fighting capability,
there is no room for bad law. Detention of those who were taught to challenge
their detention by raising claims of torture' 57 and who have been detained for three
154. Id.; see generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
155. AR 190-8, supra note 56, at 1-6(9).
156. Press Release, United States Department of Defense, DOD Responds to ABA Enemy
Combatant Report, No. 497-02 (Oct. 2, 2002) (stating that "Presidents have detained enemy combatants
in every major conflict in the Nation's history, including the Gulf War, Vietnam Conflict, and the
Korean War. During WW I1, hundreds of thousands of individuals captured on the battlefield were
subsequently held in the U.S. without trial or counsel. These detentions have always served the same
purpose - to prevent individuals from returning to the battlefield and killing.")
157. See "Prisons and Detention Center," Lesson 18, The Al Qaeda Training Manual,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm (last visited Oct. 13 ,2004) (stating "1. At the beginning of
the trial, once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State
Security [investigators] before the judge. 2. Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison. 3.
Make arrangements for the brother's defense with the attorney, whether he was retained by the
brother's family or court-appointed. 4. The brother has to do his best to know the names of the state
security officers, who participated in his torture and mention their names to the judge. These names
may be obtained from brothers who had to deal with those officers in previous cases." Id. at Lesson 18,
"Prisons and Detention Center.").
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years does not give rise to the best facts. However, the only difference between
these detainees and the prisoners of war during World War II is that the World
War II POWs did not allege torture and there was a recognized method to end the
war-surrender. Even absent the instances of inappropriate conduct at Abu
Ghraib, the American public is circumspect about wartime detention that might last
a lifetime. The U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and South
Carolina arrived at differing solutions-provide full adversarial hearings with
counsel for each detainee or release the citizen detainee unless charged with a
crime, respectively-both of which are premised on the law enforcement model
rather than the laws of war.
Never before in America's history has a non-resident alien been granted the
full protections of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. It is ironic that this
proposition has been put forth by petitioners and accepted by the courts at a time
when America is at war and the issue is protections to be afforded those who have
been detained during that war. America's criminal justice system is based on a
belief that it is better that one guilty man go free than one innocent man be
convicted. If this is the standard being used by the courts-and one might argue
that this is indeed the case-the courts have adopted a law enforcement paradigm
in a time of war. This is not the appropriate standard. Lest anyone support such a
standard for wartime detention, it is best to remember how many of the detainees
who were released returned to the fight to kill our husbands, our sons, our
daughters, and our brothers and sisters. There is little room for error when the
liberty of a person is at stake; nonetheless, in times of war, the error must be on the
side of the nation's security and the security of its armed forces.
There is an elephant in the room. Most recently, a member of a British
delegation identified the elephant and stated, "We do not believe America is at
war. This is a law enforcement action." 158 It is clear from the movement of these
cases from the lower courts through the appeals courts, and on to the Supreme
Court, that the laws of war are based on exigencies and requirements separate and
distinct from those of law enforcement. The writ of habeas corpus has thrust the
courts into a domain previously reserved to the military-the authority, mode, and
means of detaining enemy combatants. If the U.S. District Court rulings in In re
Guantanamo and Padilla v. Hanft are upheld, our enemies' ability to wage war
against us will know no bounds.
If indeed America's courts concur that detention of those engaged in acts of
war against America is premised on and regulated by the law enforcement
paradigm requiring adversarial hearings and those rights associated with the
criminal law paradigm, we as a nation must be willing to abandon our ability to
hold enemy combatants during times of war. Only those who engaged in acts
subject to criminal charges can appropriately be characterized as being within the
law enforcement umbrella. During time of war, many who engage in hostilities are
not subject to criminal charges but are nonetheless detained as enemy combatants.
158. Sir Menzies Campbell, Q.C., Address at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (July 1, 2005).
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Those detained at GTMO who have been charged with criminal offenses have been
procedural safeguards that ensure a full and fair trial. Those who are not charged
and who are detained on the basis of their status are governed by the laws of war
and have not been provided protections that flow from the law enforcement
paradigm. In war, the American courts must abide by the laws of war and avoid
inappropriately corrupting them with law enforcement concepts and rights that
render the law of war meaningless in future conflicts.

